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Abstract
We build on the stability-preserving school choice model introduced and studied recently
in [MV18]. We settle several of their open problems and we define and solve a couple of new
ones.
1 Preliminaries
1.1 The stable matching problem for school choice
The stable matching problem for schools is defined as follows: We are given as input a set of m
schools H = {h1, h2, . . . , hm}, and a set of n students S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} who are seeking admis-
sions to the schools. Each school hj has some fixed capacity c(j) of students who can be enrolled
in the school. If the school is assigned c(j) students then we say that hj is filled to capacity. If hj
is assigned less than c(j) students then we say hj is under-filled.
Every student si has a strict and totally ordered preference list l(si) over the schools H ∪ {∅}.
l(si) is ordered in decreasing order of preference, so if some student prefers a school hj to hk
then hj appears before hk on the students preference list. We allow the inclusion of ∅ to allow
partial preference lists. If a student prefers being unmatched than being matched to a school
they dislike, then such a preference is modeled by letting ∅ precede the set of unwanted schools
on the preference list of the student. We let ∅ have infinite capacity. Likewise each school hj has
a strict and totally ordered preference list l(hj) over the students S ∪ {∅}.
A matching M in this context is an assignment of students to schools that satisfy the capacity
constraints of the schools, with the added condition that no student can be matched to more than
one school. A matching is said to have a blocking pair (si, hk) if there exists a student-school pair
(si, hj) and a school hk such that si prefers hk to hj and either:
1. there is some student sj currently matched to hk such that hk prefers si to hj or
2. hk is under-filled and hk prefers si to ∅
1
.
In both the cases si would like to break her match with hj and instead go to school hk. We
define a matching M to be stable if it does not contain any blocking pairs.
2 Problem Definition
We study the assignment of students to schools in two rounds, R1 and R2, which are temporally
separated. In this section we state the two settings studied; for each, we will have two mecha-
nisms,M1 andM2. In round R1, mechanismM1 finds a stable matching of students to schools,
M. In round R2 a change is made to the sets of participants, which may cause M to no longer
be a valid or stable matching. M2 then updates M to M′ in order to ensure a stable matching.
By allowing updates, we let some students in M get unmatched in M′, or get matched to different
schools. This differs from the settings discussed in [MV18] where M2 is not allowed to break a
match created by M1.
The students report their preference lists and the mechanisms operate on whatever is reported.
We will assume that the schools’ preference lists are truthfully reported. We will show that in
Setting 1 there does not exist a mechanism that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC),
and in Setting 2 our mechanism is DSIC for students, showing that students cannot do better by
misreporting their preference lists.
We now state the common aspects of the first two settings before describing them completely. In
both, in round R1, the setup defined in Section 1.1 prevails andM1 simply computes any stable
matching respecting the capacity of each school, namely c(j) for hj. Let this matching be denoted
by M. In round R2, the City is allowed to re-allocate some students and update matching M to
a new matching M′ that is stable with respect to the round R2 participants. However, we want
to minimize the number of students in S who are re-allocated. We refer to any stable matching
M′ that optimizes this objective as a minimum stable re-allocation.
2.1 Setting I (Adding New Schools)
In this setting, the City has some new schools H′ that have opened up in R2. The preference
lists of students are updated to include schools in H′, though their relative preferences between
schools in H∪{∅} are unchanged. In particular the addition of new schools might result in some
students wanting to leave their current schools to go to a new school. This could lead to vacant
seats being created in the original schools, causing some other students to leave their current
schools and move to schools they prefer more that now have vacant seats. The City wants to find
a stable matching over students S and schools H ∪ H′ that minimizes the number of students
who are re-allocated from their school in M.
Theorem 1. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that finds the minimum stable reallocation with
respect to Round R1 matching M, students S, and schools H ∪ H
′.
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2.2 Setting II (Adding New Students)
In this setting, a set N of new students arrive from other cities in round R2. The preference lists
of schools are also updated to include students in N, though their relative preferences between
students in S∪ {∅} are unchanged. The City wants to find a stable matching over students S∪N
and schools H that minimizes the number of students who are re-allocated from their school in
M.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial time mechanismM2 that is DSIC for students and finds the minimum
stable reallocation with respect to Round R1 matching M, students S, and schools H ∪ H
′.
3 Mechanism for Adding New Schools
We first provide an example where running the Gale-Shapley algorithm over S,H ∪ H′ performs
more re-allocations than required. This motivates the design of a mechanism that finds a mini-
mum stable re-allocation by iteratively modifying the original matching M.
Example 1. Assume there are 2 students A, B and 2 schools 1,2. The preferences for A, B are (2,1),(1,2),
respectively. The preferences for 1,2 are (A, B), (B, A), respectively. In round R1, school 1 has 1 seat, and
school 2 has no seats. In round R2, school 2 adds 1 seat. (A, 1) will be assigned in round R1; adding
(B, 2) in round R2 is the only stable matching with no re-allocations. However, running Gale-Shapley
over all participants yields (A, 2), (B, 1), which requires a re-allocation.
Given a matching M, we define Preferred-Schools(si) to be the set of schools appearing before
its matched school in M. We also define Preferring-Students(hj) to be the set of students who
prefer hj to their matched school in M. Finally, we define BS-Preferring(hj) to be the student
whom hj prefers the best in the set Preferring-Students(hj). If Preferring-Students(hj) = ∅ then
we define BS-Preferring(hj) = ∅.
Algorithm 1 Mechanism for Adding New Schools in Stable Manner
Input: Stable Matching M and set H′
Output: Minimum Stable Re-allocation M′
while ∃ hj with unmet capacity and BS-Preferring(hj) 6= ∅ do
Assign BS-Preferring(hj) to hj
end while
Lemma 1. When new schools are added each student is always matched to his original school, or better,
in any minimum stable re-allocation of M.
Proof. Assume that M′ is a minimum stable re-allocation of M, and some students are worse off
in M′. Let M∗ = M ∧M′, i.e. every student gets the match they prefer in M and M′.
We first show that M∗ satisfies the capacity constraints of the schools. Let W be the students
who did worse in M′ (i.e. they are moved back to their original school in M∗). If some students
in W leave a school going from M to M′, then the students who replace them at that school
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must also be in W. To see this, observe that the school must prefer the replacing students to the
leaving students. If there is a replacing student not in W, they would form a blocking pair with
the school in M.
Next we show that M∗ is stable. Let (si, hi), (sj, hj) ∈ M
∗, and (si, hj) be a blocking pair. Then
si is matched to hi or worse in both M and M
′, but (sj, hj) must be in one of these matchings,
contradicting its stability.
M∗ is a stable re-allocation of M and has |W| fewer re-allocations than M′, a contradiction.
Proof. of Theorem 1: The proof is by induction. We show that if a student is matched to a school
at any step by the mechanism M2, then they must be matched to this school or better in any
mechanism that computes a minimum stable re-allocation.
At step 0, this is true by Lemma 1.
Assume at step n,M2 moves student si to school hj. This occurs when hj has unmet capacity and
si is BS-Preferring(hj). Any student that hj prefers more than si and who is currently matched
to a better school than hj cannot be matched to hj in any minimum stable reallocation, by the
inductive hypothesis. So si must be matched to hj or better.
We conclude that our algorithm moves students from their original schools only when they
have to be moved, thus performing the minimum number of re-allocations.
Corollary 1. All minimum stable re-allocations move the same set of students R.
Corollary 2. The algorithm returns the school-optimal minimum stable re-allocation.
Corollary 3. The algorithm runs in O(|R| ∗ |H ∪ H′|) time.
Algorithm 2 Other Minimum Stable Re-allocations With Additional School Capacity
Input: Minimum Stable Re-allocation M′, moved students R
Output: Minimum Stable Re-allocation M†
for all schools hj do
cj ← # of students in R matched to hj
Barrier(hj) ← Best student 6∈ R preferring hj.
end for
M† ← Stable-Match(R, c) respecting Barrier
return M† ∧M′
Since any minimum stable re-allocation moves the same set of students, it is easy to obtain
the other minimum stable re-allocations. Let R be the set of students moved in M′ and cj(R) the
number of students in R for school hj. Let Barrier(hj ) be the BS-Preferring(hj) not in R, and M
†
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be a stable matching on R, and capacities cj(R) for schools, where no school admits a student
worse than its barrier. Then M† ∧M∗ is a minimum stable re-allocation.
Unfortunately, no mechanism that finds a minimum stable re-allocation can be incentive compat-
ible as shown in Example 2.
Example 2. Assume there are 2 students A, B and 3 schools 1,2,3. The preferences for A, B are (2,1,3),(1,2,3),
respectively. The preferences for 1,2,3 are (A, B), (B, A), (A, B), respectively. In R1, school 1 has 1 seat,
and the other schools have no seats. In R2, schools 2 and 3 add 1 seat each. Under truthful reporting,
(A, 1) will be assigned in R1; assigning (B, 2) in R2 is the only stable matching with no re-allocations.
However, if A reports their preference as (2,3,1), the only stable matching in R2 is (A, 2), (B, 1).
Proposition 1. Adding a new school, increasing capacities of some schools, and removing students from
schools are all equivalent.
Proof. We first reduce adding a new school to increasing capacities of some schools. This can be
achieved by fixing the capacity of the new school to be 0 in round R1, and then increasing its
capacity in round R2.
To reduce increasing capacities of schools to removing students from schools, update the ca-
pacities of schools in round R1 and add dummy students who fill this extra capacity. In round
R2 the dummy students are removed.
Removing students reduces to adding a new school by adding a school in round R2 who only
likes the students to be removed, and whom all the students to be removed like more than their
original schools.
4 Mechanism for Adding a New Student
In the same vein as the previous section, we ask for a mechanism that finds a minimum stable
re-allocation, under the addition of some new students N in round R2. Our mechanism finds a
minimum stable re-allocation over any stable matching M. If M produced by M1 is a student-
optimal matching we show that (M1,M2) is DSIC w.r.t reporting preference lists of students.
We first show an example where running Gale-Shapley with the new students doesn’t compute
a minimum stable re-allocation over the underlying stable matching.
Example 3. Assume there are 3 students A, B,C and 2 schools 1,2,3. The preferences for A, B,C are
(2,1,3),(1,2,3),(3,1,2), respectively. The preferences for 1,2 are (A, B,C), (B, A,C), (C, A, B), respectively.
Each school has 1 seat. In round R1, students A, B arrive. In round R2, student C arrives. Assume that
(A, 1), (B, 2) is the stable matching computed in roundR1. Leaving these pairings unchanged and adding
(C, 3) in round R2 is the only stable matching with no re-allocations. However, running Gale-Shapley
from scratch yields (A, 2), (B, 1), (C, 3), which requires a re-allocation.
For each school hj we defined Worst-Student-Accepted(hj) as the student who is currently
matched to hj and is preferred the least among all the other students matched to hj.
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Algorithm 3 Mechanism for Adding New Students in Stable Manner
Input: Stable Matching M, set N of new students
Output: Minimum Stable Re-allocation M′
while ∃ si unmatched and (si, hj) is blocking for some hj do
Find hk most-preferred by si among all schools that (si, hk) is blocking
if hk is full then
Remove Worst-Student-Accepted(hk)
end if
Assign si to hk
end while
Lemma 2. When new students are added each student in M is matched to his original school, or worse,
in any minimum stable re-allocation of M.
Proof. Assume that M′ is a minimum stable re-allocation of M, and some students in M are
matched to better schools in M′. Let M∗ = M ∨ M′, i.e. every student gets the worse school
between M and M′.
We first show that M∗ satisfies the capacity constraints of the schools. Let B be the students
who did better in M′, and who are not in N (i.e. they are moved back to their original school in
M∗). If some students in B leave a school going from M to M′, then the students who replace
them at that school must also be in B. To see this, observe that the school must prefer the leaving
students to the replacing students. If there is a replacing student not in B, they form a blocking
pair with their original school in M.
Next we show that M∗ is stable. Let (si, hi), (sj, hj) ∈ M
∗, and (si, hj) be a blocking pair. Then
hj is matched to sj or worse in both M and M
′, but (si, hi) must be in one of these matchings,
contradicting stability.
M∗ is a stable re-allocation of M and has |B| fewer re-allocations than M′, a contradiction.
Proof. of Theorem 2: The proof is by induction. We show that if a student is matched to a school at
any step byM2, then they must be matched to this school or worse in any minimum reallocation.
At step 0, this is true by Lemma 2.
Assume at step n M2 moves student si to school hj. For any school hk that si prefers to hj, hk
must be full and si must be worse than the worst student currently accepted at hk. Now, if si
were to be admitted to hk, then there must be some student currently admitted to hk that must
be removed. But by the inductive hypothesis, this student must be matched to a worse school,
forming a blocking pair with hk.
Corollary 4. All minimum stable re-allocations move the same set of students R.
Corollary 5. The algorithm returns the student-optimal minimum stable re-allocation.
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Corollary 6. The algorithm runs in O((|N ∪ R|) ∗ |H|) time.
Algorithm 4 Other Minimum Stable Re-allocations With New Students
Input: Minimum Stable Re-allocation M′, moved students R
Output: Minimum Stable Re-allocation M†
for all schools hj do
cj ← # of students in R matched to hj
end for
for all students si ∈ R do
Sa f ety(si) ← Best school hj: ∃sk 6∈ R admitted to hj, hj prefers si over sk.
end for
M† ← Stable-Match(R, c) respecting Sa f ety
return M† ∨M′
As with the preceding setting, it is easy to find other minimum stable re-allocations by find-
ing a stable matching M† on R, c(R). For each student in R, we define Sa f ety(si) to be the best
school who prefers si to its worst admitted student not in R. We require that M
† does not match
a student to a school worse than their safety. Then M† ∨M′ is a minimum stable-reallocation.
Algorithm 3 produces a stable minimum reallocation M′ for any round R1 stable matching M.
Under the special case that M is a student optimal matching, M′ is the same as the matching pro-
duced by running Gale-Shapley on the entire set of students from both rounds. This follows as
the algorithm can be seen as a continuation of Gale-Shapley on the round R2 participants, since
each student proposes to schools in order of preference. The DSIC property of Gale-Shapley
implies incentive compatibility of our algorithm when M is a student-optimal matching.
Proposition 2. Removing a school, decreasing capacities of some schools, and adding new students are
equivalent.
Proof. The reductions are symmetric to those in the preceding section.
5 NP-Hardness Results
We show that many natural problems lying in the setting of two temporally-separated rounds
are NP-complete. The first 3 problems involve stable extensions in round R2, where we are
allowed to increase the capacities of schools but are not allowed to move students matched in
round R1. Problem 4 asks if there is a way of moving some students in M to different schools in
a way to accept more students and Problem 5 asks if there is a way of computing a single-round
capacitated max weight stable matching. We define the problems formally below:
Problem 1. A set of new students N arrive in round R2. Let L be the set of students in round R1 who
are unmatched in M. The City wants to maximize the number of students in L with which the matching
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can be extended in a stability-preserving manner. Subject to this, the City wants to minimize the number
of students N with which the matching can be extended in a stability-preserving manner. (MAXLMINN)
Problem 2. Same setting as Problem 1, but we want to first maximize the students in N, then, subject to
this, minimize the students in L. (MAXNMINL)
Problem 3. A set of new students N arrive in round R2. The City wants to extend the matching in a
stability-preserving manner to include k students from N, such that we maximize the number of students
matched from L. It can be assumed without loss of generality that k is large enough to allow for a stable
extension. (k-MAXL)
Problem 4. In round R2, we are allowed to increase the capacities of schools and re-allocate students.
The City wants to maximize the number of students in L with which the matching can be updated in a
stability-preserving manner. Subject to this, the City wants to minimize the number of re-allocations made
to the original matching in round R1.
Problem 5. Single-Round Capacitated Max-Weight Stable Matching: Given a set of students, and schools
with strictly ordered preference lists l(s), l(h) respectively, and a weight function w(j) over the edges of
students to schools, find a vector of capacities for the schools and a stable matching with respect to this
vector that maximizes the total weight.
Theorem 3. Problems 1,2,3,4,5 are NP-complete.
Proof. For all the problems we reduce from an instance of cardinal set-cover problem. We denote
an instance I of cardinal set-cover to have a sequence of sets Si ⊆ U and a universal set of
elements U = {e1, ....em}
1. For every set Si = {ei1, ei2, .., eik} we construct a corresponding school hi. The preference list
for each hi is (ni, ei1, ...., eik), where ni ∈ N is a student who only wants to go to hi. We set
the capacities of the schools to 0 in round R1. In round R2 the ni arrive. MAXLMINN will
match all ej, and the fewest possible ni. By our construction, when a student ej is admitted
to hi, ni must be admitted to hi. Therefore the admitted ni correspond to a optimal set cover.
2. The problem for MAXNMINL is symmetric to MAXLMINN . The only difference in the
reduction is to have the gadget ni be a student from L, and let the ei be students in N.
3. For every set Si = {ei1, ei2, .., eij} we construct a corresponding school hi. The preference list
for each hi is (ni, ei1, ...., eij), where ni ∈ N is a student who only wants to go to hi. We can
then solve the decision version of set cover (i.e. is there a cover of size k?) by reducing to
k-MAXL and returning yes if all L are matched and no otherwise.
4. For every set Si = {ei1, ei2, .., eik} we construct a corresponding school hi. The preference list
for each hi is (wi, ei1, ...., eik). We create another school h0 whose preference list is (w1, ...,wn).
Each wi prefers hi to h0. We set the capacity of h0 to n in roundR1, and all other schools are
set to capacity 0. In Round R2, all L will be admitted. To cover an element a school must
re-allocate the corresponding wi to that school, so minimizing the number of re-allocations
corresponds to finding a minimum set cover.
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5. For every set Si = {ei1, ei2, .., eik} we construct a corresponding school hi. The preference
list for each hi is (ni, ei1, ...., eik), where ni ∈ N is a student whose preference list is (hi, h0).
We add a school h0 with preference list (n1, n2, ....). We define weights on the edges in the
following way:
w(h0, ni) = 1, w(hj, ni) = 0, w(hj, eij) = 2.
We note that any max-weight stable extension will match all eij. Therefore, we want to
minimize the ni’s not matched to h0. So the hj who get matched to students correspond to
the sets in an optimal set-cover.
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